We extend the recent literature on the link between financial development and economic volatility by focusing on the channels through which financial intermediary development affects economic volatility. Building on Bacchetta and Caminal (2000) our theoretical model predicts that the effect of real sector shocks on growth volatility is dampened by well-developed financial intermediaries, while monetary shocks are magnified, suggesting that, overall, there is no unambiguous effect of financial intermediaries on growth volatility. We test these predictions in a panel data set covering 63 countries over the period 1960-97, using the volatility of terms of trade and inflation to proxy for real and monetary volatility, respectively. We find (i) no robust relation between financial intermediary development and growth volatility, (ii) weak evidence that financial intermediaries dampen the effect of terms of trade volatility, and (iii) evidence that financial intermediaries magnify the impact of inflation volatility in lowand middle-income countries.
Introduction
Do economies with higher levels of financial intermediary development experience more or less volatility in economic growth rates? Do intermediaries dampen the impact of external shocks on the economy or do they amplify them through the credit channel? While the recent empirical and theoretical literature has established a positive impact of financial sector development on economic growth, the potential links between financial development and the volatility of economic growth have not been studied thoroughly yet. 1 Still, the high growth volatility that many developing countries experience has brought to the forefront the question whether and to what extent output fluctuations can be related to the development of the financial sector. Explaining the determinants of growth volatility is important for policy makers who want to secure a high and stable growth rate for their economies. This paper tries to shed light on the links between financial intermediary development and growth volatility both theoretically and empirically. Previous papers have found that financial development reduces macroeconomic volatility (Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz, 2000; Denizer, Iygun, and Owen, 2000; Gavin and Hausmann, 1995) .
These results, however, have not been proved to be robust across different measures of financial development. Further, none of these papers has tried to identify the channels through which financial development potentially affects growth volatility. This paper explores the interaction of financial intermediary development and real and monetary volatility in their effect on growth volatility. Specifically, we examine whether financial intermediaries serve as shock absorbers mitigating the effect of real and monetary volatility on growth volatility, or whether they magnify their impact. Our work builds on three different strands of literature. First, we build on a large empirical literature on the relation between financial development and economic growth. 2 Financial intermediaries and markets emerge to lower the costs of researching potential investments and projects, exerting corporate control, managing risks, and mobilizing savings. Economies with better-developed financial intermediaries and markets therefore enjoy higher growth rates. This literature, however, does not explore the impact of financial development on the volatility of economic growth rates. We use an indicator of financial intermediary development developed by the literature on finance and growth to explore the relation between financial intermediary development and growth volatility.
A second relevant strand of literature has emphasized the magnifying effect that capital market imperfections have on the propagation of real sector shocks. In particular, Bernanke and Gertler (1990) show that shocks to the net worth of borrowers amplify economic up-and downturns, through an accelerator effect on investment. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) show that the interaction of investment indivisibility and the resulting inability to diversify risk not only impedes economic development, but also results in high economic volatility. Finally, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show that capital market imperfections can amplify the effects of temporary productivity shocks and make them more persistent, through their effect on the net wealth of credit-constrained borrowers.
A third related line of work is the literature on the credit channel of monetary policy Blinder, 1988 and Gertler, 1995) . changes directly affect borrowers' ability to borrow (balance sheet effect). 4 The supply of loanable funds is affected if banks cannot easily replace deposit liabilities and if banks' assets are not perfectly substitutable (bank lending channel). 5 While this literature focuses on the U.S. and the impact of monetary policy on firms and banks of different sizes, it also suggests that the banking sector can magnify monetary shocks into the real economy. 6 This paper makes several contributions. Building on a model by Bacchetta and Caminal (2000) , we show that depending on their nature, shocks to the economy are dampened or magnified by well-developed financial intermediaries. Second, we test the hypotheses derived in the theoretical model in a panel data set of 63 countries and 38 years. We explore whether financial intermediary development, defined as outstanding credits to the private sector relative to GDP, affects the impact of terms of trade and inflation volatility on economic growth volatility. Specifically, we regress the volatility of real per capita GDP growth on our measure of financial intermediary development, the volatility of terms of trade changes and inflation, and interaction terms of financial development and both volatility measures, controlling for other potential determinants of growth volatility. To test the robustness of our results, we split the sample period in different ways and use different econometric methods.
Furthermore, we conduct a variety of specification tests.
Overall, the results give qualified support for the hypotheses derived in our model. We do not find a robust relation between financial intermediary development and growth volatility. We find a negative, but generally insignificant coefficient on the interaction of financial intermediary development and terms of trade volatility, suggesting weak evidence for a dampening effect of financial intermediary development on the impact of terms of trade volatility. We find a positive and often significant coefficient on the interaction of financial intermediary development and inflation volatility. Controlling for a separate interaction in high-income countries, however, we find a positive interaction term of financial intermediary development with inflation volatility only for low-and middle-income countries, while we find no effect of monetary volatility among high-income economies. We explain the differences between highincome and low-and middle-income countries with different institutional environments that are not captured by our model.
The evidence provided in this paper contradicts previous results that financial intermediary development has an unambiguously negative effect on growth volatility.
The ambiguous effect can be explained by interactions of opposing signs between financial intermediary development and different sources of volatility. While intermediaries might help dampen real volatility, they help magnify monetary volatility in low-and middle-income countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical model and sets out the main testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the testing strategy. Section 4 discusses the main findings of the econometric analysis, while Section 5 concludes.
A Simple Model of Financial Development and Output Volatility
In this section, we describe a simple two-period model that builds on a model developed by Bacchetta and Caminal (2000) . Entrepreneurs differ in their level of wealth and therefore access to the capital markets. Financial intermediaries arise due to informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. Unlike in Bacchetta and Caminal, however, we will model the financial intermediaries explicitly and will introduce a channel for monetary policy in the form of reserve requirements. Further, we will introduce two classes of shocks, real shocks that affect only nonfinancial firms in the first round, and monetary shocks that affect only banks' balance sheets in the first round.
Since entrepreneurs produce at different productivity levels, depending on their level of internal resources, real and monetary shocks will have distributional effects that will result in a dampened or magnified effect on output depending on the nature of the shock.
The Real Sector
All individuals in our model are at the same time consumers and entrepreneurs.
Although all entrepreneurs have access to the same production technology f(k), they are endowed with different levels of wealth b. Specifically, we distinguish between two classes of entrepreneurs, High and Low, with high and low levels of wealth. The fraction β of agents are High entrepreneurs and the share (1-β) are Low entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs can use their wealth to invest in the production technology or they can deposit their wealth with banks, earning a riskless rate r D . While High entrepreneurs can fully finance their investment and have excess funds, which they deposit with banks, Low entrepreneurs cannot fully finance their investment with their own funds and will borrow funds at the lending rate r L . This might be due to investment indivisibility or required minimum investment. Due to asymmetric information about the type of investment entrepreneurs choose, and the resulting potential moral hazard problems, Low entrepreneurs face agency costs ϕ .
Assuming decreasing returns to scale in production, we can write the profit maximization problem for the High entrepreneurs as follows:
where the superscript H denotes High entrepreneurs. Since Low entrepreneurs (subscript L) face agency costs ϕ, their profit maximization problem implies
Combining eqs. (1) and (2) we obtain
The higher the agency costs or the wedge between lending and deposit rates, the higher
and the larger the wedge between the marginal productivity of Low and
High entrepreneurs. If we take the agency costs as a negative indicator of financial development, this also implies that the productivity wedge between Low and High entrepreneurs is larger in financially less developed economies.
Given the different levels of productivity, a reallocation of funds between the two entrepreneurial classes affects aggregate productivity and therefore output and growth in the economy. The larger agency costs and therefore the lower the level of financial development, the larger the effect of a reallocation.
The Financial Sector
Agents face market frictions when trying to reallocate resources between the surplus and the deficit sector of the economy. 
Since, as we show below, in equilibrium there is no uncertainty concerning repayment by borrowers, the ratio of the lending and deposit rate depends only the reserve requirement τ .
The asymmetric information and resulting agency costs lead to sub-optimal investment of Low entrepreneurs. While High entrepreneurs always choose the highest level of effort and the optimal scale for their investment project, Low entrepreneurs may choose an inefficient project, given that they share the downward risk with lenders. As described in the appendix, assuming certain functional forms for the production function, the nature of agency costs and for the level of equity of Low entrepreneurs, we get the following result.
Result 1: Agency costs ϕ are described by the following equation. 
The demand that High entrepreneurs will deposit with banks. Higher interest rates, however, will also decrease the optimal level of investment of Low entrepreneurs, so that the demand for loanable funds decreases. A higher level of agency costs ϕ and thus lower level of financial intermediary development will shift the demand for loanable funds to the left (from D 1 to D 2 ), which results in a lower level of loans k 2 and a lower interest rate. If due to monetary tightening, banks can channel less deposits to Low entrepreneurs, the supply schedule shifts to the left (S 1 to S 2 ), resulting in a lower level of loanable funds k 3 and a higher loan interest rate. Note that due to the decreasing returns to scale of the production technology, the sensitivity of the supply of loanable funds to interest rate changes increases with higher levels of agency costs.
Our model thus combines the characteristics of a model with endogenous financial intermediation with conditions for the existence of a bank lending channel of monetary policy: (i) firms cannot substitute bank lending with alternative sources of finance, and (ii) the monetary authority is able to affect the supply of loans.
General Equilibrium
We embed the previously described partial equilibrium model of entrepreneurs and banks into a simple two-period overlapping generations model. Agents are born with
, and invest and produce in the first period. In the second period they consume a fixed share of their income and leave a bequest.
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In the next subsection we explore how shocks affect the change in output from the first to the second period, and how these changes differ under different levels of agency costs ϕ and therefore financial development.
The solution to the optimization problem of High entrepreneurs is given by
and where γ is the savings rate.
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Similarly, the optimization problem for the Low entrepreneur yields:
We can combine eqs. (1) and (6) as above:
Finally, the market clearance condition for financial markets yields:
Eqs. (7) - (10) 
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Higher internal resources and a decreased wealth inequality decrease the financing constraint and thereby increase the investment share of Low entrepreneurs.
They shift the loan demand curve outwards resulting in a higher level of loans and a higher interest rates. Higher agency costs, on the other hand, increase the financing constraint. The loan demand curve shifts inwards, resulting in a lower level of loans and lower interest rates. Note that changes in the wealth distribution and leverage result in larger movements in loanable funds at high levels of agency costs, due to the higher sensitivity of the supply of loanable funds to changes in interest rates. 14
Shocks
We can now explore the effects that different shocks have on the relative composition of investment and output, and therefore output volatility. We will distinguish between shocks that affect only the real sector, i.e. the internal funds available to entrepreneurs of both classes and shocks that affect the financial sector and therefore the external funds available to Low entrepreneurs. We are especially interested in the effect that the agency costs, our measure of financial development, have on the scale of these output changes.
Real Shocks
Consider an unanticipated shock to the production function, that hits the economy during the first period, after all investment decisions have been made, i.e. y t =κf(k t ). This productivity shock can be caused by either improved technology or by lower input prices.
As can be seen from eqs. (7) and (8), the profits of the leveraged, i.e. the Low entrepreneurs, increase more than proportionally. This increases the relative wealth of Better-developed financial intermediaries alleviate the cash-flow constraint for
Low entrepreneurs and thus dampen the impact of shocks to the production function.
Note that these shocks only affect the demand for loanable funds, but do not shift the supply curve. Further, they affect banks' balance sheets only in the second round, through shifts in the loan demand curve.
Monetary Shocks
We now consider shocks that directly affect the supply of loanable funds by banks. A tightening of monetary policy through the increase of reserve requirement τ decreases the supply of loanable funds and increases the interest rate r L . However, it also lowers the leverage and thus the agency cost constraint for the Low entrepreneur. This partly offsets the negative impact of higher reserve requirements.
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This dampening effect, however, decreases as agency costs decrease. Lower agency costs ω, i.e. more financial development, therefore, increase the output effect of monetary shocks.
Result 4: The relative effect of a shock that changes the supply of loanable funds to Low entrepreneurs is smaller under asymmetric information than under perfect capital markets. The effect of the output change decreases in agency costs ω.
The financial sector thus has a magnifying effect on monetary shocks. In financially more developed economies, Low entrepreneurs depend more on external finance and therefore suffer more if banks' balance sheets are affected by changes in monetary policies. Shocks that affect the financial sector in the first round therefore are transmitted into the real sector, and this effect is stronger for financially more developed economies.
This effect is comparable to the credit channel of monetary policy. However, we concentrate on only one of the possible channels, the bank lending channel, as opposed to the balance sheet channel, the effect of monetary policy on borrowers' balance sheet, their financial position and thus capacity to borrow. Unlike the theoretical literature of the banking lending channel that focuses on the imperfect substitutability of money, bonds and loans, we focus only on loans and on reserve requirements as monetary policy tool. As in this literature, we focus on the distributional rather than the aggregate effects of monetary policy. Unlike this literature, however, we do not focus on the difference between the cost of internal and external finance, but rather on credit rationing. While the empirical and theoretical literature on the bank-lending channel implies that monetary shocks have larger implications for small firms with less access to finance, our model predicts that countries with higher levels of financial intermediary development will see their monetary shocks be amplified more. The reason for the difference is that we assume that firms in all countries depend on bank finance and cannot substitute it for other sources of finance. More financial intermediary development therefore translatesunlike in the credit channel literature -into more bank-dependence. In the empirical part, however, we will qualify this simplistic statement.
Testable Hypotheses
The theoretical model has shown that there is no unambiguous relation between financial intermediary development and growth volatility.
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Financial intermediaries can dampen or magnify the effect of shocks on growth volatility, depending on the nature of the shocks. Shocks that only affect the real sector in the first round are dampened, whereas shocks that affect the financial sector directly are magnified. While the theoretical model only considers two periods, we could easily extend this to a multiperiod model. In our empirical analysis, we should therefore find (i) no unambiguous relation between a measure of financial intermediary development and growth volatility, and (ii) no independent effect of financial intermediaries on growth volatility beyond their effect on dampening real and magnifying monetary shocks. The second hypothesis, however, builds on the restrictions of our model to the specific channel on which we focus in our model. In the following sections we will test these hypotheses in a panel of 63 countries and 38 years. We will use the standard deviation of terms of trade changes to proxy for the extent to which an economy is exposed to real sector shocks and the standard deviation of the inflation rate to proxy for the extent to which an economy is exposed to monetary shocks. Further, we will test for a separate impact of financial intermediary development on the effect of the volatility of terms of trade and inflation in high-income countries. We motivate this by the observation that the institutional environment might be sufficiently different in high-income countries to observe a different impact of financial intermediaries, especially in the channels of monetary policy. Further, as we will discuss below, an initial casual look at the data reveals different relations between volatility and financial intermediary development across different income groups.
A word of caution is due concerning the choice of terms of trade shocks to proxy for real shocks and inflation shocks to represent monetary shocks. Terms of trade shocks hit only the tradable sector of an economy directly, whereas the non-tradable sector might be affected only indirectly. Countries with large non-tradable sectors will therefore be relatively less affected by fluctuations in terms of trade. We partly control for this by including the ratio of trade to GDP in our estimation below. The interaction between financial intermediary development and inflation volatility can be interpreted as coming from either variable, since both are subject to policy decisions, at least to a certain extent.
Further, inflation volatility might reflect not only monetary policy volatility, but other factors as well, such as demand shocks and business cycle effects.
Data and Econometrics

The Data
The data come primarily from published World Bank and IMF sources.
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We create three panel data sets by aggregating over different time periods on data from 1960 to 1997. This serves partly as a robustness check on the results, and partly to avoid the problems caused by aggregating on unusual initial-or end-years. Our constructed data sets are a three-period panel (aggregated over the periods 1960-72, 1973-85, and 1986-97) , a four-period panel (1960-69, 1970-78, 1979-87, 1988-97) , and a six-period panel (1960-66, 1967-72, 1973-78, 1979-84, 1985-90, 1991-97) . We maintain a consistent sample of 63 countries across all data sets, but the number of observations differs by aggregation.
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We will focus the discussion here and in the empirical results on the threeperiod panel, since it provides the most efficient estimates of standard deviations (i.e.
based on the largest number of observations). Table 1 describes the data and Table 2 presents correlations.
The dependent variable is the standard deviation of growth in real GDP per capita within each time period. For the three-period sample, this ranges from a minimum of less than 1% (France and the Philippines in the first period, Sri Lanka in the middle period, and Ghana in the most recent period) to about 11% (Lesotho in the middle period), around a median of 2.5% (which is larger than the median growth rate for the sample of 2.1% per year).
Our measure of financial intermediary development is Private Credit, the claims on the private sector by financial intermediaries as share of GDP. Unlike other measures of financial intermediary development that have been used in the empirical growth literature, such as the share of M2 in GDP, this measure is more than a simple measure of size or financial depth. Private Credit measures the most important activity of the financial intermediary sector, channeling funds from savers to investors, and more specifically, to investors in the private sector. It therefore relates directly to our theoretical model. Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) show that Private Credit has a significantly positive and economically large impact on economic growth. Private Credit also varies significantly across countries, from less than 1% of GDP (Haiti and Congo (Zaire)) to nearly twice the level of GDP (Switzerland and Japan).
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We use the standard deviations of terms of trade changes and inflation over the corresponding periods to proxy for the degree to which an economy is subject to real and monetary shocks and thus volatility. As indicated in Table 1 , there is a large variation across countries in terms of trade and monetary volatility.
In the multivariate analysis below, we include the log of real GDP per capita and a measure of trade openness, specifically the log of the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP. There is considerable evidence that wealthy countries are more stable. Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2000) , for example, show that the standard deviation of growth in non-OECD countries is more than twice that in OECD countries. Greater openness, on the other hand, increases a country's exposure to changes in the terms of trade. It is likely that these structural differences between income classes affect both the direction and the magnitude of the impact of real and monetary volatility. In the multivariate work below, we therefore test whether the intuitive interpretation of the data can be confirmed by more rigorous analysis.
Econometric Methodology
To test our hypotheses we will run the following reduced-form regression: 
where High is a dummy variable taking the value one for countries that are classified by the World Development Report as high-income, and zero otherwise. The overall impact of the interaction of financial intermediary development and real or monetary volatility in high-income countries would then be γ 1 +γ 3 and γ 2 +γ 4 , respectively.
The interaction terms in these regressions are by definition correlated with their components. This gives rise to the problem of multicollinearity. While this does not necessarily bias the estimates, it does increase the size of the estimated variance, and,
given the relatively small sample sizes, may cause instability in the parameter estimates.
Examination of variance inflation factors 22 reveals that volatility in terms of trade changes is the largest sources of collinearity. In our empirical work, this might lead to the case where the parameter estimates on Private Credit and its interaction with the respective volatility measure are individually insignificant, but jointly significant. We therefore report the joint significance of the individual volatility measures and the interaction terms.
To control for biases introduced by the estimation of panel data, we use two different estimation strategies. The data combine cross-country and time-series, which enables estimation by conventional panel-data techniques, random-or fixed-effects regressions. These panel-data estimators are asymptotically normal as T → ∞, but in small samples, and especially when the number of groups exceeds the number of time periods, these estimators yield overly optimistic standard errors, and lead to overconfidence in the results. Our base regression is instead a pooled OLS using panelcorrected standard errors, as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995) . This allows us to correct for errors that are both heteroskedastic (that is, they differ systematically across countries) and correlated over time within countries. While the parameter estimates are found by the conventional method
, the estimated variance matrix is given by ( ) ( )
, where
ε . This is similar to the Huber-White cluster (sandwich) error correction (
), but while that method controls for differences in errors across groups, it does not allow for correlation within groups.
Note that the variance correction (weighting) matrix Ω does not assume a specific time-series error structure. We conduct an ad-hoc test for serial correlation, by estimating a common serial correlation coefficient
, where r i is the estimate of the within-country serial correlation, and w i is a weight derived from the reciprocals of the variances, which increases the efficiency of the estimates (Greene, 1993, p.457) . The ad-hoc nature of the test is that we consider the test significant if the serial correlation coefficient is close to or above 0.3, the rule-of-thumb for correction suggested by Grubb and Magee (1988) . We find significant serial correlation only in the 6-period sample, for which we present both the OLS and corrected estimates using the Prais-Winsten transformation.
We present two additional tests. First, we present a likelihood ratio test of groupspecific heteroskedasticity, following Greene (1993, p.397 (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993) . This is similar to the Wu-Hausman test, with the null hypothesis that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is consistent with the instrumental variables estimator. A rejection of the null indicates that the endogeneity of the regressors has a significant influence on the estimates, and that the equation should be properly estimated using instrumental variables. We use as instruments dummy variables indicating the source of legal tradition, a dummy variable indicating commodity exporters, and the urban population share in the total population. In no case can we reject exogeneity.
The Results
This section presents the regression results from a 63-country panel, with data averaged over three, four or six sub-periods over 1960-97. We present three sets of results. First, we discuss results from a regression without interaction terms (Table 4) .
While this does not link directly to the theoretical model, it helps us relate our paper to previous studies on the impact of financial development on growth volatility. We then present the regression results with one interaction term (Tables 5A and B) , and subsequently on regressions with two interaction terms, specifically one overall interaction term and one for high-income countries only (Tables 6A and B) . We focus on the regressions with three periods and use the regressions with four and six periods as robustness tests. Table 4 suggests a large and statistically significant impact of both terms of trade and inflation volatility on growth volatility, while no robust impact of financial The results in Table 6A (Table 6B ).
The results in Table 6A also indicate that Private Credit increases the impact of inflation volatility among low-and middle-income countries, while there is no robust evidence for high-income countries. In low-and middle-income countries, a deeper financial system exacerbates the impact of inflation volatility on growth volatility. The interaction term of inflation volatility and Private Credit enters significantly positive in the 3-period and the 4-period regressions, and the standard deviation of inflation and its interactions with Private Credit are jointly significant in all regressions. Further, the effect of inflation volatility is significant at all levels of Private Credit in low-and middle-income countries and increases with higher levels of financial intermediary development. In high-income economies, financial intermediary development seems to have a dampening impact on inflation volatility, based on the 3-period estimations. The sum of the interaction terms of Private Credit with inflation volatility is negative and significant. However, this result is not confirmed by the 4-and 6-period estimations.
Further, Table 6B shows that for the 3-period results, inflation volatility seems to have a significantly negative impact on growth volatility at all levels of Private Credit, a result not confirmed by the 4-period and 6-period regressions. The results for low-and middle-income countries are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model, while the results for the high-income economies do not completely match the theoretical predictions. This might be explained both by the limitations of our model, as well as by institutional differences between low-and middleincome and high-income economies that are not captured by the variables in our empirical explorations. In low-and middle-income countries, the capacity of financial intermediaries to serve as conduit for monetary policy increases as the financial sector develops and the real sector becomes more dependent on external financing. In most of these economies, our assumptions that banks cannot easily substitute deposits for other sources of funding and that firms do not have easy access to alternative source of external financing, might be appropriate. In high-income countries, on the other hand, there are two opposing effects. While firms depend more on external finance in financially more developed economies, financial intermediaries also have easier access to non-deposit sources of funding, which reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy (Ceccetti, 2001 and Kashyap and Stein, 1995) . Further, firms have also easier access to alternative sources of external financing, such as capital markets.
While we have interpreted the positive interaction term between inflation volatility and Private Credit as evidence for a magnifying role of the financial sector in the propagation of monetary volatility in low-and middle-income countries, one could also interpret this interaction in the view of recent research that has shown the negative impact of inflation on financial sector development (Boyd, Levine, and Smith, 2001 ).
This interpretation would characterize inflation volatility as decreasing the ability of financial intermediaries to serve as shock absorber and thus its capacity to reduce growth volatility. However, the insignificance of Private Credit in the regression without interaction terms and the joint insignificance of Private Credit and its interaction terms in Tables 5 and 6 are counter to this interpretation.
Concluding Remarks
This paper (i) assessed the impact of financial intermediary development on growth volatility and (ii) explored potential channels through which these two variables might be linked. In our theoretical model financial intermediaries arise to alleviate agency costs and cash flow constraints on entrepreneurs and thus dampen the impact of real shocks. At the same time, financial intermediaries serve as conduit for monetary policy propagation into the real economy. Our theoretical model thus predicts a dampening effect of financial intermediaries on the propagation of real shocks and a magnifying effect on the propagation of monetary shocks. Depending on the shocks an economy is exposed to and the relative size of these shocks, financial intermediaries might therefore have an overall dampening or amplifying impact on growth volatility.
Our empirical analysis of 63 countries over the period 1960-97 confirms this prediction and does not show any significant impact of financial intermediaries on growth volatility.
Further, we find only weak evidence for a dampening role of financial intermediaries in the propagation of terms of trade shocks. However, we find a magnifying role of intermediaries in the propagation of monetary shocks in low-and middle-income countries, while no role is apparent in high-income economies.
Our results shed doubts on previous studies that have found a negative relation between indicators of financial development and growth volatility. However, the different effects that financial intermediaries have in the propagation of real and monetary shocks can explain this insignificance. If, on average, an economy is hit by both real and monetary shocks, the dampening and magnifying effects of financial intermediaries cancel each other out.
Our results suggest some general conclusions. First, while well-developed financial intermediaries foster economic growth, they do not, on average, affect its volatility. Second, instability in macroeconomic policies, namely in the conduct of monetary policy, may increase growth volatility, an effect that is magnified by financial intermediaries. Finally, our results do not imply that financial sector policies are irrelevant to the volatility that economies suffer. The ownership structure of the banking system, for example, might be important, especially the presence of foreign banks.
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Further, the regulatory and supervisory framework might have an impact on the extent to which financial intermediaries serve as absorbers or as propagators of exogenous shocks (Caprio and Honohan, 2001 ).
This appendix discusses the derivation of result 1. It follows closely the discussion in Bachetta and Caminal (1996, 2000) .
We assume that all entrepreneurs have access to the same production technology
There is a continuum of investment projects, indexed by α, which can be operated at different scales. Specifically, if an entrepreneur selects project α and invests k units of her resources, she obtains the following level of output y:
where f(k) is twice continuously differentiable, with positive first and negative second derivative. Furthermore, we assume lim k→0 f'(k)=∞ and lim k→∞ f'(k)=1. The parameter α lies in the interval [α,1], with 0<α<1. Further, the function µ(α) is such that µ(1)=1 and 0≤αµ(α)<1 for any α∈[α,1). The profit maximizing project is α=1, since expected output equals f(k). Lower levels of α, on the other hand, imply lower average level and higher dispersion of expected output. While k is public information, α can only be observed by the entrepreneur. This informational asymmetry gives rise to potential moral hazard, since no contract can be written on the choice of a specific project α that maximizes output. Depending on the financial structure, entrepreneurs might be induced to adopt a sub-optimal project, i.e. α<1.
We can now derive the profit maximization for both High and Low entrepreneurs.
High entrepreneurs will maximize profits
subject to α ∈[α,1). They will choose α=1 and the efficient scale of investment so that the marginal product equals the opportunity costs of depositing resources at the bank
. No agency problems arise since High entrepreneurs exclusively work with internal resources.
Low entrepreneurs, on the other hand, have to borrow resources beyond their own wealth to produce. Due to asymmetric information, ex-post output can only be verified by an outsider by incurring verification costs η. Financial intermediaries will offer a debt contract that defines an interest rate and loan amount and maximizes the Low entrepreneur's profit:
subject to α ∈[α,1). The use of external resources and the asymmetric information concerning α might induce Low entrepreneurs to adopt α<1. While α<1 might imply lower output, it might actually increase the entrepreneur's profits. Only if internal resources b are high enough, will the Low entrepreneurs choose α=1 and the incentive problem is thus non-binding. In the following we will concentrate on the case where the incentive problem is binding, so that the Low entrepreneur chooses α<1, if she is offered the first-best contract, as defined below. In the following we will therefore have to restrict the functional forms of f(k) and µ(α). While asymmetric information and the resulting incentive problems might be reflected by either higher interest rates (to compensate that the entrepreneur chooses α<1) or credit rationing (if the entrepreneur chooses α=1) in optimal financial contracts, in the following we will focus on credit rationing.
First, we assume the following functional form for agency costs µ:
where z is a constant, 0<z<1. Notice that µ(1)=1 and α α α αµ
, implying that expected output increases in α. In order to avoid negative levels of output we assume that the lower limit α=exp{-1/(1-z)}, so that µ(α)=0. A higher z implies a higher level of moral hazard since it reduces the incentives to choose the efficient project. It can thus be interpreted as proxying for the institutional deficiencies in an economy that result in less efficient financial intermediation.
Second, we assume the following functional form for the production function f(k):
where 1-z<λ<1. With this specific functional form we rule out that variation of output depends on its level and can therefore focus on the role of financial market imperfections.
We can now rewrite eq. (A.3) as follows:
The optimal contract is a pair (r L ,k L ) that solves eq. (A.3') subject to the budget constraint of the financial intermediary and the incentive compatibility constraint.
L ) is an interior solution, then it will be characterized by the following first-order condition:
. The higher r L the lower α and the higher the probability for the intermediary of incurring verification costs.
We can now rewrite eq. (A.3') and (A.4) as follows:
Note that both the entrepreneur's and the intermediary's profits increase in α. 
However, we assume that Low entrepreneurs have such a low level of wealth that if they were offered the first best contract
, then the incentive constraint would be violated.
, and solving for b L we get Condition A:
where ω=λ/(1-z). In order to fulfill eq. (A.6) at equality (α=1), Low entrepreneurs therefore receive a loan that results in suboptimal investment, i.e.
1 See King and Levine (1993a,b) and Levine and Zervos (1998) for correlation between financial intermediary and stock market development and economic growth. Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) , Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) , Levine (2001), Neusser and Kugler (1998) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) provide evidence for a causal impact of financial development on economic growth. Also, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) show that firms in countries with an active stock market and large banking sector grow faster than predicted by individual firm characteristics. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that industries that rely more heavily on external finance grow faster in countries with betterdeveloped financial systems. 2 For an overview of the theoretical literature, see Levine (1997) . For the empirical literature, see the previous footnote. 3 See also the literature cited in Kashyap and Stein (1995) . 4 A number of papers show that liquidity constraints become binding for small firms in the U.S., which depend more on bank loans than large firms, after the Fed tightens its monetary policy. See among others, Hubbard (1989), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) , Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) , Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) , Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), and Morgan (1998) . See also the survey in Kashyap and Stein (1994) . 5 Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) present evidence for the U.S. that smaller banks' lending volume is more affected by changes in monetary policy than large banks' lending volume. Jayaratne and Morgan (2000) show that there is a positive correlation between loan growth and insured deposit growth in the U.S. and that this correlation increases in a bank's leverage. They interpret this as evidence for a bank lending channel of monetary policy. 6 In a recent paper Cecchetti (2001) uses a sample of OECD countries to show that the output effect of monetary policy is larger in countries with more concentrated and less healthy banking sectors and with less access to non-bank finance. 7 We thus abstract from other channels, such as risk diversification through financial intermediaries. 8 We assume that f(k) is twice differentiable, with positive first and negative second derivative. Furthermore, we assume lim k→0 f'(k)=∞ and lim k→∞ f'(k)=1. 9 An alternative way to introduce monetary policy in our model economy is by having bonds, i.e. assets with a safe return, but which are not a perfect substitute to loans. Open market operations by the Central Bank would then affect banks' bonds and due to the imperfect substitutability also loan holdings. See also Goodfriend (1995) , who points out that in the U.S. the decrease in deposits that follows monetary tightening is due to demand shifts. 10 A constant saving rate can be obtained by assuming either log utility or a Leontief utility function. However following Bacchetta and Caminal (2000) , we assume a Leontief utility function since they imply risk neutrality, which in turn justifies the expected profit maximization assumed for entrepreneurs in the previous section. 11 To guarantee a unique steady state equilibrium, we have to assume (1-λ) 
See proof in Appendix 2 in Bacchetta and Caminal (1996) . 12 See Bacchetta and Caminal (2000) . 13 The effect (9) and (10). 14 Bacchetta and Caminal also show that the effects of changes in the composition of investment are persistent over time. For the sake of shortness, we leave this out here. 15 This can be seen from eq. (9) by taking the derivative with respect to b L /k L. The negative derivative increases in absolute terms in agency costs ω. See also Appendix B in Bacchetta and Caminal (2000) . 16 This can be seen by taking the derivative of eq. (9) with respect to τ. Without agency costs, this derivative is unambiguously positive. However, since leverage k L /b L decreases with higher reserve requirements, a negative term is added to the derivative that increases in agency costs ω. 17 While our model considers output volatility, we can easily turn it into a growth model with an exogenously given trend growth rate. Real and monetary shocks would then results in deviations from this trend growth rate and consequently to growth volatility. 18 See Appendix Table 2 for details. 19 See Appendix Table 1 for the list of countries. We restrict the set of countries to those that have at least 8, 5, and 3 observations in the 3, 4, and 6-period samples, respectively. 20 To control for potential non-linearity in the relation between growth volatility and financial intermediary development, we include Private Credit in logs in the regressions. 21 These are medians, and do not control for the fact that many of the lower-middle-income countries are small states (e.g. Panama, Costa Rica, Papua New Guinea, Fiji) which depend heavily on trade. 22 The variance inflation factor for a variable X j from a vector of regressors X is computed as 1/(1-R 2 j ), where R 2 j is the multiple correlation coefficient from a regression of X j on all other elements of X. A common rule of thumb is to be concerned with any value larger than 10. 23 For the effect of foreign banks on banking sector stability, see for example Peek and Rosengreen (2000) and Crystal, Dages and Goldberg (2001) . Impact of terms of trade volatility on growth volatility, high-income countries Impact of inflation volatility on growth volatility, high-income countries 6-period Impact of terms of trade volatility on growth volatility, low-and middle-income countries Impact of inflation volatility on growth volatility, low-and middle-income countries
